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DEMOCRACY UNCAGED 
OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE 
THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW 
WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT). Sanford 
Levinson. 1 Oxford University Press. 2006. Pp. ix + 233. 
$28.00 (cloth). 
Suzanna Sherr/ 
Sanford Levinson's latest book, like his previous work, is 
charmingly written and delightfully quirky. Aimed primarily at 
non-lawyers, it is meant to persuade readers that we ought to call 
a constitutional convention to remedy what he calls the "hard-
wired" defects of the Constitution: defects that inhere in the very 
structure of the constitutional fabric and that therefore cannot 
be remedied through even the most creative interpretation (pp. 
23, 29). The most important of these defects, according to Levin-
son, are the existence and operation of the Electoral College, 
other problems surrounding the presidency, allocation of power 
in the Senate, bicameralism and the resulting opportunity for po-
litical minorities to block popular legislation, and the near-
impossibility of amending the Constitution. Despite the light 
tone of most of the book, Levinson is deadly serious: In the 
course of writing the book, he says, his commitment to remedy-
ing our undemocratic, "abusive" Constitution "has moved far 
from an academic project (in the pejorative sense)" (p. 172). He 
therefore closes the book with suggestions on how to make a 
constitutional convention a reality. 
Unfortunately, as is often the case with heartfelt visionary 
projects, his call for a convention suffers from two complemen-
tary flaws. He overstates the Constitution's defects and under-
states the risks of submitting it to a constitutional convention for 
revision. Reading between the lines, we might fairly attribute 
1. St. John Garwood Chair in Law. University of Texas School of Law. 
2. Herman 0. Loewenstein Professor of Law. Vanderbilt University Law School. I 
thank Lisa Bressman and Paul Edelman for helpful suggestions. 
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these flaws to Levinson's underlying motivation: He is guided by 
his objection to the maneuvers of the Bush administration and 
his devotion to the governmental ideals of Thomas Jefferson. I 
address each of his errors in turn. 
Let us begin with the Electoral College, which Levinson 
says ''supplies the decisive and overriding reason for rejecting 
the status quo and supporting a convention" (p. 82). The main 
thrust of Levinson's critique of our "dreadful system of presiden-
tial selection" (p. 81) is that it gives an "indefensible advan-
tage ... to low population states" (p. 89). According to Levin-
son. this undemocratic allocation of power causes a variety of 
ills: (1) Presidents are frequently elected without winning a ma-
jority of the popular vote, and occasionally even when they come 
in second in the popular vote; (2) Voters in states like New York 
or Texas, which are reliably Democratic and Republican, respec-
tively. might as well throw their votes away because they don't 
matter; and (3) Presidential candidates ignore all but a few "bat-
tleground states." 
Of course, most of these problems are not directly attribut-
able to the Electoral College. The ability of a candidate to win 
the White House with only a plurality of the popular vote is due 
not to the Electoral College but to our "first-past-the-post" 
method of determining winners. The other two problems derive 
from the way that states allocate electors, which is not mandated 
by the Constitution. States are free to choose how to allocate 
their electors, and it is only because 48 states have chosen to al-
locate them on a winner-take-all basis that there exist "safe" 
states and ''battleground" states.' If most states divided their 
electors according to the percentages received by each candidate 
in the state's popular vote, candidates would fight for every vote 
in every state-and every vote would count. Alternatively, there 
is now a movement among the large states to agree to allocate all 
of their electors to whichever candidate wins the national popu-
lar vote, which would effectively eliminate all of the problems 
associated with the Electoral College. And on a deeper level, it 
is the domination of two-and only two-parties that allows the 
Electoral College to function in the problematic ways that Lev-
inson describes.4 
3. The two states that do not use the winner-take-all method are Maine and Ne-
braska. See 21-A Maine Rev. Stat.§ 805(2); Neb. Rev. Stat.§ 32-714. 
4. Levinson does note in passing that the Electoral College is not solely responsi-
ble for manv of the flaws he identifies (e.g .. pp. 87-88 (state allocation of electors). 97 
(first past the post)). But the concession is meaningless as long as he directs so much of 
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That leaves two problems with the Electoral College itself 
(and the back-up of a decision by the House, voting state-by-
state, if no candidate gets a majority of electors): The election of 
a president who lost the popular election, and the basic unfair-
ness of giving small states a disproportionate number of electors. 
The first is indeed a flaw, but Levinson exaggerates its impor-
tance. Only four times since 1789 has the Electoral College given 
the White House to a candidate who did not garner the most 
popular votes-and three of those were before 1900.' Moreover, 
all but once the popular majority got its revenge four years later, 
voting for the party (and twice the candidate himself) that had 
been cheated out of the presidency by the Electoral College." 
George Bush is the only minority president to win the popular 
vote the second time around. Levinson's overstated concern with 
the problem of a minority president, then, might be related to his 
obvious loathing of Bush. It might be worthwhile to amend the 
Constitution to eliminate the Electoral College, but one misfire 
his thunder at the Electoral College. He also mentions the movement among states to 
agree to allocate electors according to the popular vote (p. 97). 
5. Levinson would make it five. by adopting the controversial position of a 2005 
book that Nixon actually won the popular vote in 1960 (pp. 82-83, 93. relying on 
GEORGE C. EDWARDS. WHY THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BAD FOR AMERICA 48-51 
(2005)). While that position has the advantage of making Levinson look non-partisan 
(and doubling the number of Electoral College misfires in the last hundred and twenty 
years). it is belied by most other sources. Even Edwards recognizes that the "traditional 
count" puts Kennedy ahead by about 120.000 votes. /d. at 65. And if we're going to split 
hairs. there's another factor to consider. Edwards calculates that Nixon won the popular 
vote by 58.181 votes. /d. at 50. But in 1960. residents of the District of Columbia could 
not vote for president (the 23rd Amendment was not ratified until 1961). In 1960. the 
population of D.C. was 763.956. See http://www.infoplease.com/ipa!A0922422.html. It is 
likely that had they been eligible to vote. D.C. voters would have voted overwhelmingly 
for Kennedy. Thus. it was the undemocratic exclusion of D.C. voters that produced Ken-
nedy's purportedly unfair electoral victory: in a more democratic system. Kennedy would 
have been the popular winner (as well as the electoral winner). 
6. For a brief discussion of the four undisputed minority presidents. see, e.g .. 
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY. A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 137-38 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter. FARBER & SHERRY. A HISTORY]. 
7. His hatred of Bush is palpable throughout the book. Almost all of his concrete 
examples of presidential flaws center on Bush (e.g .. pp. 47--48 (managing to lambaste 
Bush in the course of a critique of the veto power even while acknowledging that at the 
time of writing Bush had not yet vetoed a single bill): pp. 79-81 (using Bush's actions in 
the War on Terror as an example of why questions surrounding the presidency are im-
portant): pp. 107-08 (citing the Bush administration's reliance on "unwritten prerogative 
powers" of the executive): pp. 111-12 (using Bush's appointment of John Bolton to criti-
cize recess appointments): p. 116 (arguing that there is "nothing academic" about the 
possibility of an incompetent president. because "[e]ven if one places the war in Iraq to 
one side. there is the utter failure of executive branch leadership in the aftermath of Hur-
ricane Katrina")). In discussing the Electoral College. he invites the reader to ''[r]eturn 
once more. if one has 1he slomach for if. to the 2000 Florida election" (p. 90. emphasis 
added). 
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in a hundred and twenty years is hardly sufficient justification for 
Levinson's call to consider junking the entire structure of the 
Constitution. 
So what about the essential unfairness of the Electoral Col-
lege? By giving each state the same number of electors as its to-
tal of Senators and Representatives, the theory goes, the Elec-
toral College advantages small states and disadvantages large 
ones. It does give small states an advantage (at least when com-
bined with a winner-take-all allocation of electors), but does it 
give disproportionate power to voters in small states? The an-
swer, paradoxically, is that it does not. Indeed, it gives voters in 
large states more power, and voters in small states less, than they 
would have if we chose the president through a simple nation-
wide popular vote. 
It is tricky to define voting "power," but the most satisfac-
tory way to do so is to focus on the probability that an individ-
ual's vote is pivotal: that is, to ask how likely it is that the result 
would change if the particular voter voted the other way.8 In the 
case of the winner-take-all regime under the Electoral College, 
any individual's voting power is the product of the probability that 
her vote would change the outcome in the state (call this P) and 
the probability that a change in the state's electoral votes would 
change the outcome of the election (call this S). It can be shown 
mathematically that P is approximately 1/.J population of voters, 
and that Sis approximately equivalent to the state's voting popu-
lation.9 Since states do not differ much in the ratio between total 
population and voting population,'0 we can simplify the equation 
8. This the commonly accepted measure. See DAN S. FELSENTHAL & MOSHE 
MACHOVER. THE MEASUREMENT OF VOTING POWER: THEORY AND PRACTICE. 
PROBLEMS AND PARADOXES 196 (1998). 
9. See GUILLERMO OWEN. GAME THEORY 294-303 (3d ed. 1995). For a more ac-
cessible discussion. see Paul H. Edelman. Making Votes Count in Local Elections: A 
Mathematical Appraisal of At-Large Representation. 4 ELECTION L.J. 258. 266-70 (2005). 
10. Using data from the Census Bureau (http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/) and the 
Federal Election Commission (http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm). one 
can construct a chart comparing each state's total population to the number of people 
who voted in any given election. If we do so for the 2000 election. for example. we find 
that the highest percentage of the total population voted in Maine (51%) and the lowest 
in Arizona (30% ). The average is 39% and the standard deviation is .052 (which means 
that in approximately 60% of the states, between 34% and 44% of the total population 
voted (tabulated data on file with author)). EDWARDS. supra note 5. at 40. reaches a dif-
ferent result by calculating what percentage of each state's voting-age population actually 
voted. Since electors are allocated on the basis of total population rather than on the ba-
sis of voting-age population. however. his numbers are irrelevant-which suggests that 
Levinson may be too quick to rely on his data. 
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by using state populations. Any individual's voting power, then, 
IS 
p X S 
or 
[llv' state population ] x state population 
or 
the square root of the state population 
Thus, the larger the population of the state, the more voting 
power each of its citizens has. In short, a majority of the Ameri-
can public (in whom Levinson places so much trust) may be right 
in failing to abolish the Electoral College. 
The Constitution also creates other problems surrounding 
the presidency, according to Levinson. In particular, he objects 
to the lack of clear limits on presidential power, the inability to 
remove a president who is incompetent but not criminal, and the 
10-week delay between the election and the inauguration of a 
new president. The last is essentially trivial, and Levinson de-
votes only 5 pages to it (pp. 98-103). The others are arguable, 
but Levinson seems so blinded by his hatred of this President 
that he cannot see any advantages to the current structure. 
For example, most constitutional scholars recognize that it 
is both impossible and unwise to delineate governmental powers 
so clearly that no ambiguity remains. As John Marshall famously 
reminded us, "it is a constitution we are expounding," and we 
cannot expect it to be precise in providing for every eventuality. 11 
Levinson himself notes that he is "relatively dismissive of am-
biguous constitutional provisions" because they do not pose a 
serious problem (p. 108). So why is he so irate about ambiguities 
in executive power? Because- he says after describing the infa-
mous John Yoo torture memo and similar arguments as "an 
open invitation for those who would defend something close to 
presidential dictatorship" (p. 107)- "[ t ]he basic problem with 
the presidency is the possibility that the occupant of the White 
House is too unconstrained and can all too easily engage in dra-
matic exertions of power, especially in the realm of foreign pol-
icy" (p. 108). It might be that he has a particular occupant of the 
White House and a particular foreign policy adventure in mind 
here. 12 He also dismisses out of hand the possibility that Con-
11. McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316. 407 (1819). 
12. It is worth noting that Levinson·s implicit criticisms of George W. Bush have 
been explicitly leveled at Thomas Jefferson as well. One noted historian described Jeffer-
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gress or the courts might rein in such overzealous exercises of 
executive power (pp. 107-08), essentially disregarding the 
checks-and-balances theory on which the entire structure of the 
Constitution is based. 
Levinson presents his case for presidential removal in a sec-
tion titled "On Malfeasance and Misfeasance: Why Criminal 
Presidents Present Less of a Threat than 'Merely' Incompetent 
Ones" (pp. 114-21). He contrasts our system with that of Great 
Britain, in which an "unpopular" prime minister can be (and often 
is) "unceremoniously dumped" (p. 116). In the United States, 
however, we must await the next election: "A noncriminal presi-
dent is thought to have an unbreakable four-year lease on the 
White House .... Why in the world should 'We the People' not 
be able to break the lease and evict a manifestly unsuitable or 
incompetent president and replace him with someone presuma-
bly more able?" (p. 117). 
Three things about this argument are worth noticing. First, 
he subtly elides the differences among "incompetent," "unpopu-
lar," and "unsuitable." If he equates the three, that makes 
George Bush incompetent and therefore appropriately remov-
able. Second, the lease is almost certainly not as unbreakable as 
he maintains: President Clinton was impeached not because he 
committed "high crimes [or] misdemeanors" but because he was 
unpopular with the party in control of the Congress. Wisely or 
not, the House and Senate respectively retain the power to im-
peach and convict a president they find truly "unsuitable" (much 
less "incompetent"), and the judiciary is unlikely to interfere. 13 
Interim congressional elections provide a means for the elector-
ate to reject the president's party and thus increase the chances 
that Congress will at least impede his program and perhaps im-
peach him. Third, the Framers went round and round on this 
very question, concerned that a broad power to remove a presi-
dent-wherever lodged-would make the executive too depend-
ent and thus likely to pander rather than lead. The impeachment 
clause was their compromise solution.14 It may not be the best 
son's 1807 Embargo of Great Britain (almost uniformly recognized as ineffective in ac-
complishing its goals and an economic disaster for the United States) as a ·•stubborn de-
mand for sacrifice in a cause that millions of citizens had become sick of." Eric 
McKitrick. The View from Jefferson's Camp. N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS. Dec. 17. 1970. at 35. 
38. 
13. See Nixon v. United States. 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (impeachment is a political 
question that should not be resolved by the courts). 
14. For the particular debates. see FARBER & SHERRY. A HISTORY. supra note 6. at 
113-15. 125-29. 145-46. 
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approach, but is it worth risking the rest of the Constitution on 
the chance that we might improve on their solution? 
Turning to the defects of the legislative branch, the alloca-
tion of power in the Senate need not detain us long. Levinson 
points out-as many others have before him-that equal repre-
sentation in the Senate "makes an absolute shambles of the idea 
that in the United States the majority of the people rule" (p. 58). 
Levinson is right that giving each state two Senators is neither 
fair nor democratic. Few people would defend it (and I am not 
one of them). 15 The real question, though, is whether this defect 
warrants the calling of a convention and the potential abandon-
ment of the entire Constitution. It rarely matters, except for the 
few powers that the Senate alone wields and the exacerbation of 
the ability of a minority to block legislation. The Senate is also 
just the manifestation of a deeper problem that Levinson does 
not address: The very existence of states as independent sover-
eigns is a historical accident that serves no defensible purpose 
today. If we equalize representation in the Senate, why not turn 
the states into administrative divisions of the national govern-
ment? We are, after all, a single nation, and other nations get 
along just fine without a federal structure. Levinson's solution 
does not go far enough, and, as with his attacks on the executive, 
one wonders whether that is because he has more of a problem 
with the Senate and its Republican members (the book was writ-
ten before the 2006 midterm elections) than with its structural 
make-up. 
Finally, Levinson objects to bicameralism and the fact that 
the Constitution is nearly impossible to amend. They suffer from 
essentially the same flaw, according to Levinson, which is to 
make it difficult for majorities to enact their preferences into 
law. Bicameralism and the presidential veto (which Levinson 
characterizes as creating a tricameralist system) provide too 
many "veto points" that allow representatives of a minority of 
the population to block legislation (pp. 29-49). Similarly, the Ar-
ticle V amendment process is an "iron cage" (p. 165). He accuses 
the Framers and those who support the Constitution of being 
"fundamentally fearful of change and ... willing to pay a high 
15. Levinson in fact notes (p. 58) that I have previously attacked the allocation of 
power in the Senate. in Suzanna Sherry. Our Unconstitwional Senate. in 
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 95-97 (William N. 
Eskridge. Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds .. NYU Press 1998). But some scholars (even some 
who live in large states) are willing to defend the Senate. See Saikrishna Prakash. More 
Democracy, Less Constitlltion. 55 DRAKE L. REV. 899 (2007). 
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price to prevent what they would deem unfortunate changes" (p. 
35). Here, as elsewhere in the book, Levinson's biases are show-
mg. 
He divides the world into two types of people and asks the 
reader into which category she falls: 
Is it worth it, in order to deprive your opponents of the oppor-
tunity to work their political will, to make it more difficult to 
pass your own favorite programs? Or, on the contrary, would 
you rather have a greater likelihood of achieving your own 
goals even if this means that your opponents would be more 
likely to succeed if and when they are in power? (p. 38). 
But both of these questions assume that you have "favorite pro-
grams." In other words, both exhibit a pro-big-government and 
anti-libertarian bias. For some people, the question may not be 
whether they would like to enact some program, but rather 
whether as a matter of principle (and maybe pragmatism) they 
believe that the government should adopt as few programs as 
possible-or at least that there are not many contexts in which 
government programs are likely to be an improvement on the 
status quo. 16 Levinson has no room for such people, and would 
presumably lump them in with the spiteful sorts who are willing 
to sacrifice their own goals just to keep their opponents from 
getting anything. 
This anti-libertarian bias may be somewhat hidden, but Lev-
inson is open about his bias in favor of majoritarianism-indeed, 
it is the underlying premise of the book. And casting his lot with 
those who would make legislation favored by the majority easier, 
even when he himself might be in dissent, is just one example. 
Part of the reason he focuses on "hard-wired" defects is because 
he objects to the undemocratic underpinnings of the whole Con-
stitution: "The dreadful fact is that none of the great institutions 
of American politics can plausibly claim to speak for the major-
ity of Americans, even though all assert such claims" (p. 49). But 
Levinson's majoritarianism raises two serious questions: whether 
the counter-majoritarian aspects of the Constitution are neces-
sarily flaws, and whether his proposed majoritarian cure is worse 
than the disease. 
On the counter-majoritarian aspects of the Constitution, 
Levinson is not alone in attacking what he sees as a "democratic 
16. For a principled defense of superrnajority rules, see John 0. McGinnis & Michael 
B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REv. 703 (2002). 
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deficit" in our constitutional system. 17 It is a truism (but true 
nevertheless) that the Constitution does not establish a pure ma-
joritarian democracy. The Bill of Rights and a few other provi-
sions place direct limits on the power of popular majorities. Ju-
dicial review-contemplated by the Framers even if not 
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution1H -offers further protec-
tion against the tyranny of the majority. Levinson's critique of 
the structure of the legislative and executive branches is just a 
more interesting (but no less misguided) twist on the current 
academic fervor for "popular constitutionalism": the transfer of 
power from organs of government to the people themselves. 19 
But does Levinson really want pure majority rule? It seems 
not. He does not criticize judicial review, and he approves of 
rights-based limits on government. 20 And to the extent that he 
approves of the power exercised by administrative agencies 
(something he does not discuss), he is willing to tolerate quite 
another large democratic deficit. 
What he fails to recognize is that the structural provisions 
he does attack are part and parcel of the same majority-limiting 
system as judicial review and the Bill of Rights. The institutions 
of government are structured to filter majority preferences 
through more deliberative bodies, in order to preserve stability 
and to, in Madison's words, "protect the people against the tran-
sient impressions into which they themselves might be led."21 In-
deed, Madison and other Federalists believed that a Bill of 
Rights was unnecessary because the structure of the Constitution 
itself would prevent Congress from trampling individual rights. 
So Levinson's argument that the Constitution gives minorities 
power to influence (and occasionally block) legislation favored 
by the majority is exactly the point. 
17. See Sanford Levinson. How the United States Constitution Contributes to the 
Democratic Deficit in America, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 859 (2007). 
18. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1127 (1987). 
19. For a description and a critique of popular constitutionalism, see DANIEL A. 
FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (2008). In its most common form. popular constitutionalism is an 
attack on the Supreme Court and judicial review. 
20. On rights. see. e.g.. pp. 5, 175: on judicial review. see Prakash. supra note 15, at 
912 ("Professor Levinson's notable failure to call for the elimination of judicial review 
suggests that he has a rather large soft spot for at least one extremely undemocratic veto 
point"). 
21. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 
at 193 (Tues. June 26. 1787) (Ohio University Press 1966). 
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Leaving aside the inconsistency in Levinson's approach to 
various undemocratic aspects of the Constitution. he and I part 
company primarily in how much (or how little) faith we place in 
government by referendum. The unwavering faith in the wisdom 
of popular majorities that underlies his attack on the Constitu-
tion also gives rise to his proposed solution to the democracy 
deficit: a constitutional convention and a national referendum to 
ratify the convention's handiwork. I turn, then, to that solution. 
In proposing a constitutional convention, Levinson is aware 
that it would be essentially uncontrollable and could revise any 
or all of the Constitution. As he says, many friends with whom 
he has discussed his proposal, especially liberals, "envision a 
runaway convention that would tear up the most admirable parts 
of the Constitution" (p. 174 ). His response is to assert his faith in 
the American people: 
I continue to have sufficient faith in the democratic ideal that 
I believe that most of the public, in a truly serious debate 
about the Constitution, could be persuaded to support the es-
sential rights that are required for membership in a republican 
political order (p. 175). 
He provides no evidence for this assertion. of course. And im-
mediately after making it. he backtracks. He notes that the fears 
of his liberal friends are not totally unwarranted, "unhappily ac-
knowledg[ing] that they are drawn from the experiences of the 
twentieth century and the potential for disaster in certain kinds 
of pseudodemocratic, demagogic politics from which the United 
States is certainly not immune" (p. 175). He agrees that "many 
recent proposals for new amendments are absurd or pernicious" 
(p. 176). His response to the latter problem, that we should at-
tack those proposals "while at the same time proposing other, far 
more desirable changes" (p. 176), misses two points. First, he is 
not simply proposing new amendments, but a constitutional con-
vention-and once we have a second convention, it becomes 
more likely that we will have a third, a fourth, and so on, under-
mining the stability that has been a hallmark of American gov-
ernment. Second, the proposed amendments are not only perni-
cious in themselves, they are illustrative of the type of proposals 
that might come out of a constitutional convention. 
And it is not just proposed amendments that should give us 
pause. As many scholars have shown, the success of direct de-
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mocracy at the state level has been mixed at best.cc In particu-
lar-and as one might expect-state constitutional amendments 
adopted by referendum have been especially intolerant of mi-
nority rights.c3 Two common examples are amendments prohibit-
ing ~ay marriage and amendments prohibiting affirmative ac-
tion:4 Both might well end up in any document produced by a 
constitutional convention. Imposing super-majority require-
ments (especially for legislation that would raise taxes) is an-
other popular subject for direct democracy, which runs directly 
contrary to Levinson's critique of "veto points." 
Polls are also a predictor of the likely results of a constitu-
tional convention, and they are not encouraging. Polls consis-
tently show that a majority of Americans oppose the constitu-
22. See, e.g .. RICHARD J. ELLIS. DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE 
PROCESS IN AMERICA (2002): DAVIDS. BRODER. DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE 
CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF MONEY (2000): THOMAS E. CRONIN. DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE. REFERENDUM. AND RECALL (1989): Erwin 
Chemerinsky. Challenging Direcc Democracy. 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 293 (2007): Ethan 
J. Lieb. Can Direcc Democracy Be Made Deliberacive?. 54 BUFF. L. REV. 903 (2006): 
Glen Staszewski. The Baic-and-Swicch in Direct Democracy. 2006 WISC. L. REV. 17: Cody 
Hoesly. Reforming Direct Democracy: Lessons from Oregon. 93 CAL. L. REV. 1191 
(2005): Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins. Social Choice, Crypto-/nitiatives, and 
Policymaking by Direct Democracy. 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949 (2005): Sherman J. Clark. 
The Character of Direcc Democracy. 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 341 (2004): Elizabeth 
Garrett. Money, Agenda-Setling, and Direcc Democracy. 77 TEX. L. REV. IH45 (1999): 
Sherman J. Clark. A Populisc Cricique of Direct Democracv. 112 HARV. L. REV. 434 
(1998): Elizabeth Garrett. Who Direcrs Direct Democracy?. 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 
17 (1997): Julian Eule. Judicial Review of Direcc Democracy. 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990): 
Cynthia L. Fountaine. Lousy Lawmaking: Quescioning che Desirability and Consticwion-
alicy of Legislating by Initiative. 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 ( 1988). 
23. See, e.g .. ANTI-GAY RIGHTS: ASSESSING VOTER INITIATIVES (Stephanie L. 
Witt & Suzanne McCorkle eds .. 1997): John C. Brittain. Direct Democracy by che Major-
icy Can Jeopardize che Civil Righcs of Minoricy or Ocher Powerless Groups. 1996 ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 441 (1996). 
24. Between 1998 and 2007. voters in half the states approved constitutional 
amendments prohibiting gay marriage. In at least 8 of the 25. the amendment originated 
with We the People rather than with the legislature. See Alabama Canst. Art. I. § 36.03 
(approved 2006): Alaska Const. Art. I. § 25 (approved 199H): Arkansas Const. Amend. 
83. §I (approved 2004) (initiative): Colorado Canst. Art. 2. § 31 (approved 2006) (initia-
tive) Georgia Canst. Art. I.§ 4. ,-r I (approved 2004): Idaho Canst.§ 28 (approved 2006): 
Kentucky Const. § 233A (approved 2004): Louisiana Canst. Art. 12. § 15 (approved 
2004): Michigan Canst. Art. 1. § 25 (approved 2004) (initiative): Mississippi Const. Art. 
14. § 263A (approved 2004): Missouri Canst. Art. I. § 33 (approved 2004): Montana 
Const. Art. XIII.§ 7 (approved 2004) (initiative): Nebraska Const. Art. I.§ 29 (approved 
2000) (initiative): Nevada Canst. Art. I.§ 21 (approved 2002) (initiative): North Dakota 
Const. Art. 11. § 28 (approved 2004): Ohio Canst. Art. XV.§ 11 (approved 2004) (initia-
tive): Oklahoma Canst. Art. 2. § 35 (approved 2004): Oregon Canst. Art. XV.§ Sa (ap-
proved 2004) (initiative): South Carolina Const. Art. XVII.§ 15 (approved 2006): South 
Dakota Canst. Art. 21. § 9 (approved 2006): Tennessee Const. Art. II.§ 18 (approved 
2006): Texas Canst. Art. 1. § 32 (approved 2005): Utah Canst. Art. 1. § 29 (approved 
2004): Virginia Canst. Art. 1. § 15-A (approved 2006): Wisconsin Canst. Art. 13. § 13 
(approved 2006). 
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tional ban on school prayer,25 believe the United States is a 
Christian nation,26 and do not believe in evolution27 -so the Es-
tablishment Clause might be in serious jeopardy under Levin-
son's proposal. One 2007 poll found that only 60% of Americans 
agree with the statement "Newspapers should be allowed to 
freely criticize the U.S. military about its strategy and perform-
ance. ,zH (Maybe Levinson finds it more comforting than I do that 
a bare majority of the American public seems to support the 
core of the First Amendment's free-speech protections.) 
I find these snapshots of the American public disturbing, 
and enough to make me afraid of a constitutional convention. 
Levinson, I am sure, would accuse me of being Madisonian or 
Hamiltonian. He describes "most liberals" as "fully Madisonian 
in being close to terrified of the passions of their fellow citizens" 
(p. 174), and calls views like mine a "fear of the uncaged beast of 
American democracy-a view identified more with the quasi-
monarchical Hamilton than with the unabashedly democratic 
Jefferson" (p. 176). And indeed, Levinson acknowledges his own 
"deep Jeffersonian roots" (p. 225), opening the book with a long 
quotation from Jefferson and closing it with a paean to his hero: 
If a critical mass does indeed agree that our Constitution is se-
riously defective, then a campaign would have the potential to 
capture national attention and forge a new consciousness .... 
Thomas Jefferson would yet live. Who knows where the spirit 
of critical reflection might lead? Perhaps it would contribute 
25. See First Amendment Center, State of the First Amendment 2007: Final Anno-
tated Survey, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/pdf/SOF A2007results.pdf ("First 
Amendment Center Poll") (Question 25) (Percentage of Americans agreeing with the 
statement "Teachers and other public school officials should be allowed to lead prayers 
in public school": 57% (1997), 65% (1999), 65% (2000), 52% (2005), 58% (2007)). See 
also id. (Question 34) (50% of Americans agree, 47% disagree, with statement "A public 
school teacher should be allowed to use the Bible as a factual text in a history or social 
studies class"). This poll, which is also cited in notes 26 & 28, also asked about political 
affiliation, and 30% of respondents said they were Democrats, 28% said they were Re-
publicans, and 26% said they were Independents. /d. (Question 49). 
26. See Pew Forum Surveys: Many Americans With Mix of Religion and Politics, 
http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DociD=l53 ("Pew poll") (Percentage responding 
"yes'' to the question "Is the U.S. a Christian Nation": 60% (1996), 67% (2002), 71% 
(2005), 67% (2006)). See also First Amendment Center Poll, supra note 25 (Question 27) 
(55% of Americans support the statement "The U.S. Constitution establishes a Christian 
nation.") 
27. See Pew Poll, supra note 26 (only 26% of Americans believe in evolution 
through natural selection); see also CBSNews.com, Poll: Majority Reject Evolution, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/10/22/opinionlpolls/main965223.shtml ("51% of 
Americans say God created humans in their present form, and another three in 10 say 
that while humans evolved, God guided the process"). 
28. See First Amendment Center Poll, supra note 25 (Question 15). 
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to the reinvigoration of the American experiment in govern-
ment by the people and the construction of a constitution bet-
ter fitted to meet the demands of our twenty-first-century so-
ciety (p. 180). 
153 
So it comes down to this: Are we better off following the 
political philosophy of Hamilton (and the early Madison) or that 
of Jefferson? A full-blown comparison is beyond the scope of a 
book review, but here are just a few data points: Jefferson's 
blind adulation of democracy led him to support the French 
Revolution (which quickly degenerated into the worst kind of 
tyranny) while Hamilton was an early and famously fiery oppo-
nent.29 Hamilton was a self-made man, rising from an ignoble 
birth to high office through talent and hard work.3° For all his 
democratic oratory, Jefferson was an aristocrat and a petty ty-
rant, selling his slaves to satisfy his own debts and freeing only 
five of them (out of more than a hundred) in his will. 31 Jeffer-
son's view of Hamilton illustrates this difference between them: 
One of Jefferson's sympathetic biographers describes him as 
having "all the scorn of a Virginian, of the old stock, for the im-
migrant of doubtful birth, who was almost an alien. '' 32 As the 
first Secretary of the Treasury, the commercially minded Hamil-
ton took the new nation's weak, debt-ridden economy and put it 
on a stable footing." The romantic agrarian Jefferson, by con-
trast, ran his own estate into the ground and nearly did the same 
to the national economy.34 Jefferson was as ardent a defender of 
29. See, e.g., RON CHERNOW. ALEXANDER HAMILTON 316--17,429-37.459 (2004). 
30. See id. at 7-82. 
31. See, e.g., DARREN STALOFF, HAMILTON, ADAMS. JEFFERSON: THE POLITICS 
OF ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 237--40 (2005) (Jefferson as aris-
tocrat); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK. THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 201-04 (1993) 
(same); JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
147--49 (sale of slaves), 288-90 (failure to free most slaves at his death) (1997); Paul 
Finkelman, Jefferson and Slavery: "Treason Against the Hopes of the World," in 
JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES 181 (PeterS. Onuf ed., 1993) (same). 
32. GiLBERT CHINARD, THOMAS JEFFERSON: THE APOSTLE OF AMERICANISM 
270 (1929). 
33. See, e.g., David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History: Alexander Hamilton, The 
Federalist, and the Supreme Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 755, 794--804 (2001). See also 
STALOFF, supra note 31, at 91 (calling Hamilton's financial reports "among the most bril-
liant government reports in American history"). 
34. On Jefferson's private descent into bankruptcy. see, e.g .. Herbert E. Sloan, 
PRINCIPLE AND INTEREST: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE PROBLEM OF DEBT (1995). 
On Jefferson's ruin of the national economy, see, e.g., STALOFF, supra note 31, at 346--47; 
see also id. at 359-60 (Jefferson's "agrarian idyll threw a web of Romantic rhetoric over 
the underdeveloped and crude character of southern rural society"): Gordon S. Wood, 
The Trials and Tribulations of Thomas Jefferson, in JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES 395, 411 
(PeterS. Onuf ed., 1993) ("He did indeed want comforts and prosperity for his American 
farmers, but like some modern liberals he had little or no appreciation of the economic 
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states rights as Hamilton was a nationalist-and it is therefore 
somewhat ironic that Levinson would excise from the Constitu-
tion some of its most state-friendly components. 
In short, Jefferson was a visionary; Hamilton was a realist. 
As one scholar puts it: 
[I]t was Alexander Hamilton who made the twentieth century 
'"the American century." ... [T]he foundation of America's 
superpower status was laid in the early days of the republic, 
when Alexander Hamilton, who had a vision of American 
greatness, battled with forces fearful of concentrated political, 
economic, and military power necessary to achieve great-
ness. . . . 1 efferson was the poet of the American founding, 
while Hamilton was the nation builder who infused the essen-
tial e,!ements of permanence and stability in the American sys-
tem. 
Jeffersonian utopianism may be fine as an aspiration, but when it 
comes to a functioning government, Hamilton beats him hands 
down. 
Americans are periodically infatuated with Thomas Jeffer-
son and his vision of an idyllic democratic republic of yeoman-
farmer statesmen. Legal scholars passed through what Joseph 
Ellis calls a "Jeffersonian Surge"36 in the 1980s, focusing on the 
Jeffersonian idea of civic republicanism. 37 Levinson's attachment 
to Jefferson is apparently more enduring, and Our Undemocratic 
Constitution is an odd amalgam of that earlier era and today's 
scholarship on popular constitutionalism, producing a proposal 
that is as unabashedly optimistic as Jefferson himself was.:ll< 
And yet, in the end, I can't help but wonder whether Levin-
son is more Hamiltonian than he lets on. In mid-June 1787, the 
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia was deep into its 
comparison between the Randolph proposal to write a new, 
forces that made such prosperity and comforts possible"). 
35. Stephen Knott. "Opposed in Death as in Life": Hamilton and Jefferson in 
American Memory. in THE MANY FACES OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: THE LIFE AND 
LEGACY OF AMERICA'S MOST ELUSIVE FOUNDING FATHER 25-26 (Douglas Ambrose 
& Robert W.T. Martin eds .. 2006). 
36. ELLIS. supra note 31. at 14. 
37. For a survey of legal scholarship on civic republicanism (and its critics). see 
Suzanna Sherry. Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship. 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 131. 133-45 (1995). As is typical of legal scholars, they were twenty years behind 
historians. whose veneration of Jefferson had been declining since the 1970s. See ELLIS. 
supra note 31. at 16-19. I must admit that I was an active contributor to the civic republi-
can literature. but I hope my work was tempered with realism. 
38. On Jefferson's optimism, see CHERNOW, supra note 29, at 316-18: Wood. supra 
note 34. at 413. 
2008] BOOK REVIEWS 155 
more nationalist constitution (strongly supported by Madison) 
and the cautious, less nationalist New Jersey proposal to merely 
amend the Articles of Confederation. On June 18, Hamilton 
took the floor and spoke for hours- his remarks run more than 
10 pages in Madison's Notes and are the only entry for that day.3y 
He "declare[d] himself unfriendly to both plans," and proposed 
a breathtakingly radical substitute that included abolishing the 
states altogether, establishing an equivalent to the British House 
of Lords, and letting the executive serve for life as "an elective 
Monarch." 40 Given that such a plan had no chance of succeeding, 
one might speculate that Hamilton's speech was a tactical at-
tempt to make the Randolph plan look moderate. If so, it suc-
ceeded: The next day, Madison himself gave an impassioned 
speech in favor of Randolph's proposal and the Convention 
voted seven states to three (with one state divided) to reject the 
New Jersey plan.41 
If Levinson hopes his radical call to arms will result in a few 
much-needed (and less radical) amendments, I applaud him. But 
if he truly believes that we should call a second constitutional 
convention, he ought to heed Charles Pinckney's warning at the 
end of the first one: "Nothing but confusion and contrariety 
could spring from the experiment. ... Conventions are serious 
things, and ought not to be repeated."42 
39. MAOism;. supra note 21. at 129-39 (Monday June 18. 1787). 
40. !d. at 129 ( .. unfriendly .. ). 136 ("elective Monarch .. ). 
41. !d. at 140-48 (Tuesday June 19. 1787). 
42. /d. at 651 (Saturday September 15. 1787). 
